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Abstract— Can computers overcome human capabilities? 
This is a paradoxical and controversial question, particularly 
because there are many hidden assumptions. This article focuses 
on that issue putting on evidence some misconception related 
with future generations of machines and the understanding of the 
brain. It will be discussed to what extent computers might reach 
human capabilities, and how it could be possible only if the 
computer is a conscious machine. However, it will be shown that 
if the computer is conscious, an interference process due to 
consciousness would affect the information processing of the 
system. Therefore, it might be possible to make conscious 
machines to overcome human capabilities, which will have 
limitations as well as humans. In other words, trying to overcome 
human capabilities with computers implies the paradoxical 
conclusion that a computer will never overcome human 
capabilities at all, or if the computer does, it should not be 
considered as a computer anymore. 
Keywords—Artificial Intelligence; Information processing; 
Cognitive Computing; Type of Cognition; Super Machine; 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
During many centuries, scientists and philosophers have 
been debating about the nature of the brain and its relation with 
the mind, based on the premise of an intrinsic dualism, 
typically called mind-body problem [1], [2]. Arguments take 
one form or another, however, most of them can be reduced to 
one kind of dualist or non-dualist view [3]. The importance of 
these debates acquires even more relevance when the question 
is stated as the possibility to build machines which would be 
able to reproduce some human capabilities as emotion, 
subjective experiences or even consciousness.   
The problem is actually worst when some scientists claim 
a new future generation of computers, machines and/or robots 
which would overcome human capabilities. In view of this 
paper, these claims are based on misconceptions and 
reductionism of current most important issues. The idea, 
however, is not discarded here and is expressed in a different 
way to show its paradoxical consequences. For example, the 
idea of reaching and overcoming human capabilities implies 
the knowledge of a set of distinctive processes and 
characteristics which define being a human (e.g. intelligence, 
language, abstract thinking, create art and music, emotions and 
physical abilities, among others). This simple idea leads some 
fundamental issues. First, claims about new futurist robots do 
not define this set of distinctions; they do not care about the 
importance of what it is to be a human. Secondly, they assume 
a materialist view of these distinctions (i.e. these distinctions 
emerge from physical and reproducible interaction of matter) 
without explaining the most fundamental questions about the 
matter [4]. Thirdly, they do not explain how subjective 
experience or emotions could emerge from the theory of 
computation that they assume as a framework to build 
machines, which will overcome humans. In other words, these 
views do not explain foundations of computation that support 
or reject the idea of high level cognitive computers. Finally, 
engineering challenges of building these kinds of machines are 
not trivial, and futurists assume reverse engineering as the best 
tool to deal with this, when even some neuroscience 
techniques do not seem to give us any information about 
simple computing devices such as microprocessors [5]. 
Actually, if methods of neuroscience are not inferring useful 
information from microprocessors, it is possible to conclude 
that either neurons are not working as computers or all the 
information that we know about cells and neurons from these 
techniques is wrong. The first option discards reverse 
engineering as a feasible tool to understand the brain, and the 
second option discards findings in neuroscience related to 
mechanistic and computational interpretation. Thus, it is still 
necessary to focus in many intermediate and fundamental 
steps to declare that some computers would reach or overcome 
human capabilities.      
This work does not expect to solve these issues; on the 
contrary, the aim of this paper is briefly to put in evidence 
misconceptions and misunderstanding of some crucial 
concepts. Additionally, the importance of new concepts and 
ideas will be approached in a preliminary and speculative way, 
with the intention of expanding them in further works. 
Following this framework in order to make clear some of the 
questions above, the first section will define what will be 
understood by human capabilities and human intelligence; the 
second section will confront current common view of 
computation, cognitive computing and information processing; 
the third section will discuss a basic requirement to make 
computers with similar human intelligence; the fourth section 
will show a new hypothesis of how this requirement could 
work; then, machines will be classified in four categories based 
on four types of cognitions derived from this requirement, and 
finally the last section will show some paradoxes, which 
emerge from the idea to make machines-like-brains reaching 
and overcoming humans. 
II. HUMAN CAPABILITIES  
Usually, it is considered that computers, machines and/or 
robots will eventually reach, or even overtake human 
intelligence. This idea is supported by many advances in 
Artificial Intelligence (AI). For example, consecutive victories 
of DeepMind project versus the GO human champion [6], or 
robots that have passed some kind of Self-Consciousness test 
[7]. Science fiction, movies and writers also stimulate and play 
enough with the notion of “Singularity”, the precise moment 
where machines exceed human capabilities [8]. In this 
scenario, a computer/machine is called Super Machine.  
Nevertheless, how much does scientific evidence support 
this idea? Can computers really overcome human intelligence? 
What does human intelligence mean? Computers already 
exceed human algorithmic calculations, among many others. In 
fact, one option to overcome human abilities might be a 
cognitive system completely different to the anthropocentric 
science fiction view. As it will show later, this kind of 
computer may overcome some, but not all, human capabilities. 
That is why; one position could claim that it is not necessary to 
assume computers like brains to overcome human capabilities. 
It is a valid point; however, will this kind of computer 
overcome human brain only in a rational/algorithmic way or 
also an emotional one? Will this kind of computer be able to 
dance better than us, to create better than us, to feel better and 
like us? Otherwise, it will never overcome human abilities. 
One reason is because part of being human is to have 
emotional behaviour, to be able to dance, create, etc, 
additionally to our apparently rational behaviour. In fact, 
emotional behaviour might be more important for a definition 
of human being than rational behaviour. As it was mentioned 
above, the first issue emerges: what does human being mean? 
It is not possible thinking to overcome human abilities if it is 
not understood what it is to be a human and which abilities 
need to be overcome. For example, human intelligence may not 
be only associated with logical, algorithmic or rational 
thinking. Types of intelligence have already been suggested, 
which are closely related to each other such as kinaesthetic and 
emotional intelligences in humans [9], [10]. So far, 
implementing emotions or simple movements in machines is 
equal or more complicated than implementing rational or 
algorithmic intelligences [11]. Actually, current 
implementations of emotions in machines are based on a 
logical, computable and deterministic way, leaving out 
essential characteristics of emotions such as that emotions 
interfere with rational processes and optimal decisions. In fact, 
these implementations are based on the idea that emotions play 
an important role in becoming humans more efficient, 
rationally speaking [12], when cognitive fallacies are showing 
the contrary [13], [14] and experiments on neuroscience from  
the called default neural network, which is related with self-
oriented information,  are suggesting anti-correlated 
subsystems of information processing [15]–[17] which 
interfere between them. The view of computer non-like-brain 
does not care about this and assumes intelligence as only 
rational, logic and computable capability; or even worst, the 
problem of computer non-like-brains defenders is to think that 
some properties of life could be replicated without the 
distinctive properties of being alive.  
For the purpose of this work, we will need to assume that 
there is certain set of “human being” properties and it is 
possible to decide when an animal or machine reach or not the 
condition to be part of this set, even when it is known that the 
definition of this set is one of the most controversial and 
debated issues. 
III. COMPUTATION AND INFORMATION PROCESSING IN THE 
BRAIN 
One supporting fact about the idea of reaching and 
overcoming human capabilities with computers comes from the 
exponential increase of computational capacity or Moore's law 
[18]. This increase should impact on the development of new 
technologies, until reaching intelligence levels of human brain. 
Beyond this thought, there is the assumption that the brain 
works as a computer and its processing could work by  analogy 
with computational processes. Of course, the brain is a physical 
entity as computers are; it partially works with electrical 
signals, resolves complex problems and is processing 
information in one way or another. Nevertheless, the way how 
the brain processes information is still unknown and at least, it 
may not be necessarily digital computation, or even more, 
maybe it could not be information processing in computational 
abstract terms at all [19]. Information processing implies 
processes where input are changed to become outputs; however 
the brain could be working in a new regime, where distinction 
between inputs and outputs could not exist, even causalities 
could be completely different to what we know until now. In 
this context, it should be possible to speak about another kind 
of processing as “replication processing”, which could be self-
informative to some singular physical systems like brains. It 
also known that brains work with complex neuromodulation 
[20], storages information in a sparse and unknown way [21], 
[22], and most distinctive yet: complex properties as subjective 
experiences, emotions, consciousness [23]–[25] and biased 
behaviour [13], [26]–[28] emerge from the brain. These 
emergent properties do not have relation with higher or lower 
computational capability. For example, the cerebellum has 
more neurons than any other part of the brain, but it does not 
play any important role in conscious perception [29]. 
Related with this notion, a common assumption in 
cognitive science is to consider processing of information as 
synonym of computation; however it is necessary to 
differentiate both concepts. For instance, if information is 
considered as the content of a message, this content would 
need a physical system to be propagated and stored. Thus, 
information may be understood or at least associated with a 
physical entity [30]. According to general view, information 
processing can be any physical process which transforms an 
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input into an output. Information processing can also be 
defined in terms of causality between inputs and outputs. 
Additionally, computation could be understood as syntactic and 
symbolic manipulation of information [2]. In this sense, 
computation is an algorithmic and deterministic type of 
information processing. Although it is possible to appeal to a 
non deterministic computation, in general, this non 
deterministic computation can be reduced to deterministic 
types of simple computation at level of Turing test. The 
problem is that brains are not just doing computation, they are 
also able to give interpretations and meaning to their own high 
level information processing. Arguments in favour of this idea 
are stated from philosophical view in [2] and 
psychological/biological view in [25].  
One interesting case of computation is artificial neural 
networks, which could be interpreted as semi-deterministic 
information processing systems. Artificial neural networks 
evolve in a non deterministic way thanks to self-learning and 
trained from some given rules, which are not always explicitly 
programmed.  Since artificial neural network as for example 
Hopfield networks [31] are inspired by biological principles 
[32], [33], which are in turn inspired by biological observations 
[34], one option to introduce semantic and meaning to artificial 
networks could be implementation of interactions between 
subsystems as observers of each other in a context of artificial 
neural networks. It will be discussed in next sections. Through 
this way, intelligence would not be only associated with 
deterministic logical computation but with the interaction 
between deterministic, semi-deterministic, non-deterministic, 
and perhaps quantum computation, or even new frameworks of 
processing of information.  
While some computer and cognitive scientist might not 
agree with this interpretation of information and computation, 
it is still admissible to have processing of information without 
computation and intelligence without a deterministic way of 
processing of information. Actually the brain apparently does 
it. In fact,  the most important features of the brain are the 
result of unpredictable, nonlinear interactions among billions of 
cells [35], [36]. Science does not know which are the real 
decodes and encodes of the brain; does not know as cognitive 
abilities emerge from physical brains, and even more 
complicated, it is not certain that we have a deterministic way 
to explain how this emergency works. 
At this point, the usual idea of digital computation in 
cognitive science and neuroscience should change in favour of 
a perspective of computation and information processing by 
analogy with physical systems where inputs, rules and outputs 
can be interpreted in a physical and global way. 
The brain should not be thought as a digital computer 
neither in the “software” [1], [2]  nor in the “hardware” [19], 
[37], [38]. One reason is because this analogy obscures the 
complex physical properties of the brain. On the one hand, 
neuroscience and cognitive science use indiscriminately 
concepts as information, computation and processing of 
information without understanding of their physical 
counterpart, sometimes based on the assumption of not 
hardware dependency of these concepts, other times due to 
assumptions of how the brain encodes and decodes 
information. The most common assumption is to think that 
activation or spikes in neurons is the only informative state. 
While other cells as astrocytes [39], and non classical 
integration as neuromodulatory substances [20], back-
propagation [40], among others [38] are ignored. In addition, 
inactivation and deactivation states could also be encoding 
valuable information about dynamical brain states at macro 
and micro scale. Neurons never are in static state and their 
membranes are presenting fluctuations that could still be 
informative. The distinctive physical brain properties and their 
dynamical interactions are apparently more important than 
computational views were thinking, which implies that 
hardware can not be ignored at all. According to this point, the 
analogy between a drum and the brain could be more 
informative than the analogy brain-computer. Drums can 
respond with different and complex vibration states when they 
are stimulated, and they can be also understood on 
computational terms: input (hits), rules (physical laws, 
physical constrains such as material, tension, etc), and outputs 
(vibration, sounds, normal modes). Indeed, the brain has many 
more similarities with a dynamical system as a drum than with 
digital computers, which are based on discrete states. Drums, 
as well as brains, are dynamical systems with emergent and 
sub-emergent properties, drums have different modes of 
vibration, superposition, physical memory, sparse storage of 
this memory, among others features. In abstract terms, drums 
are also computing and processing information, but this 
information processing is a dynamical reaction from external 
stimuli more than a formal calculation process (computation 
as defined above).  
On another hand, computer science is losing valuable 
information on the attempt of replicating brain capabilities. 
One example could be alpha, gamma or oscillations of brains 
in general [41], synchrony [42], [43], harmonic waves [44], 
among other processes which are not seriously considered in 
artificial intelligence, neither using artificial neural networks. 
This characteristic should be understood and incorporated in 
order to implement desirable social behaviour in new 
generations of computers, machines and robots. Considering 
that some of these behaviours are intrinsically related to 
biological organisms, perhaps these behaviours are not 
reproducible without some intrinsic constituents of information 
processing of biological organisms [45], [46] as for example 
oscillations.  
Finally, abstractions and general concepts are really useful 
in theoretical terms; however concepts as computation, 
information and information processing in the brain do not 
have evident interpretation. Realizing that these concepts 
should not be used as an analogy with computers is the only 
way to lead us to the correct direction: Focusing on differences 
between brains and computers, and trying to fill the gaps 
without assumptions. Maybe, for many computer scientists, 
these comments are trivial, but what computation means for 
computer science is not the same than for biological science, 
leading misunderstandings and misconceptions, while also the 
knowledge that computer sciences have about codification in 
the brain is very limited, leading to erroneous assumptions.  
To sum up, these two section have identified some usual 
presumptions: i) The assumption of a set of distinctive 
properties defining human being, ii) intelligence related only to 
logical and rational thinking, iii) brains working by analogy 
with hardware-independent computers, iv) computation as 
synonym of information processing, and v) brain information 
only encoded in activation states of neurons. When differences 
between concepts appear, it becomes necessary to clarify some 
of them. For example, a better understanding and definition of 
information processing in the context of human intelligence, 
where computation will be a kind of information processing 
between many other types, including the characteristic one to 
biological organisms [46]. Probably, new concepts and 
foundations of information will also be needed, especially to 
understand the real encode and decode of brain cells, as a 
crucial theoretical starting point. These foundations should be 
intrinsically related to minimal constitutive parts of physical 
theories. Thus, computer-brain analogy is not useful anymore, 
at least in the current sense. Nevertheless, it could still be 
possible to replicate some brains abilities thanks to new 
formulations of information processing and theoretical 
frameworks. 
IV. CONSCIOUSNESS AS REQUIREMENT 
Intelligence should also be considered as a whole. 
Intelligence is often understood as the ability to solve problems 
in an efficient way, thanks to other mechanisms as learning and 
memory. This means, the maximization of the positive results 
in our solution while minimizing the negative impacts, for 
instance, waste of time. To do that, other processes as learning 
and memory are also needed and associated with the definition 
of intelligence. In a general sense, learning may be understood 
as the process to gain new knowledge or improve some 
behavior, while memory is the storage of this knowledge. To 
solve problems efficiently, it is necessary to access a certain 
memory that was acquired thanks to a specific learning that 
will be modifying again the memory of the system. The more 
intelligent is the system, the more it learns. However, in this 
framework it is forgotten that emotions as subjective 
experiences, and cognition are deeply related to human 
intelligence [36]. They play a crucial role in learning, in 
consolidation of memories, retrieved memory and in human 
cognition in general [25].  
Furthermore, one requirement for emotional and 
logical/rational intelligences seem to be what is called 
subjective experience [47] or in a more complex order: 
Consciousness. Humans first need to be conscious to take some 
complex rational decisions, to plan, and to have the intention to 
do something [48], [49]. For example, vegetative patients and 
minimal conscious patients do not present signals neither 
planning nor having intentions to do minimal tasks [50], even 
when they could present minimal signs of consciousness [51]. 
Planning and intentions apparently emerge when minimal signs 
of consciousness exceed a threshold. In fact, these minimal 
signs can be interpreted as predictors of recovering in minimal 
conscious patients [52], [53].  Other works are re-defining the 
idea of subjective experience until its minimal constitutive part 
and argue the existence of minimal subjective experience even 
in insects [47]. It could mean that complex decisions, planning 
and having intentions are different from consciousness, 
although they are closely related: Subjective and conscious 
perceptions are apparently previous to rational intelligences, 
planning and even to efficient behaviors. Experiments in 
psychology of judgment and behavioral economics have also 
shown as subjects tend to perform some tasks in a biased way 
even when they have been trained, suggesting that logical and 
rational intelligences appear only after more elaborated 
information processing [13], [14]. It is clear that how biology 
implements high intelligences is completely different from how 
computer science implements it [11].   
The need to incorporate subjective experience and 
eventually consciousness implies a complex problem which 
involves many different processes as awareness, emotions, 
subjectivity, intentionality, and attention, among others. 
Consciousness should be formed from all of these processes 
like a differentiated and unified whole, but it is not any of 
them. For example, it could be necessary to be aware to have 
emotions and subjective experiences, or maybe vice versa, and 
we will need them to show intentionality, attention and high 
level cognitive abilities. It is also necessary to insist and 
distinguish that these are different processes, for example 
awareness and attention; while it is important understanding all 
of them as constituent parts of what we define as 
consciousness. 
Together, these ideas could imply that to reproduce high 
level of human intelligence in a biological way, it is necessary 
to introduce subjective and conscious behaviour in machines at 
early stages. As subjective experiences and conscious 
behaviour are closely related with emotions, and emotions are 
related with learning and intelligence in humans, the only way 
to overcome human brains would be making conscious 
machines which would be able to reproduce emotional human 
intelligence, in addition to logical intelligence. In order to 
implement high-level-computers, that is to say computers-like-
brain, it will be necessary to focus on conscious human 
capabilities, and how it is impacting the information processing 
of the system. 
V. CONSCIOUSNESS INTERACTION HYPOTHESES 
It is common to think that computer reaching human 
capabilities is only question of time. From the comments 
above, the question is not how much time it is necessary to 
reach human abilities with machines; the question is how to 
implement consciousness in machines, when it is not already 
known what consciousness is. The problem is also that 
consciousness can be understood in many different ways and 
actually, there is not any correct and complete definition about 
consciousness.  
Instead, it is possible to identify some characteristics of 
consciousness, awareness and conscious perception. First, it is 
not matter of capacity of computation. The brain should not be 
considered as a computer neither doing any computation like a 
computer. Although, if someone would like to insist, the brain 
capacity can be roughly estimated in 20 petaFLOPS, assuming 
100 billions of brain cells, 200 firings per second, 1000 
connections each cell (see other approximations [54] ), whereas 
independently of any approximation, 80% of these brain cells 
(hence its computational capacity) are in the cerebellum, which 
does not play any important role in conscious perception [29]. 
Additionally, the most powerful computer has 93 petaFLOPS 
(Sunway TaihuLight [55], [56]) and it is really unlikely that 
someone ensures that this computer is aware because of its 
bigger computational capacity. Secondly, evidence has shown 
that conscious perception needs between 200 to 400 ms, and 
some experiments also suggest a discrete mechanism instead of 
a continuous perception mechanism [57]–[60]. For example, 
evidence for discrete mechanism of perception comes from 
psychophysical experiments where two different stimuli are 
presented with a short time window between each other. In 
these experiments, subjects perceived both stimuli as occurring 
simultaneously, suggesting a discrete temporal window of 
perception integration [57], [59]. Other experiments, where 
subjects are exposed to masked stimuli (words or pictures 
which are masked by previous stimuli), have showed that 
conscious perception (i.e. subjects report seeing the stimulus) is 
associated with a positive peak in Event-related potentials 
(ERPs) which appear 300-500 ms after the stimulus 
presentation  [58], [59]. This response is called P3b and has 
also been related with attention and memory processes. On the 
contrary, the processing and integration of information at low 
level tasks only need 40 ms. In other words, when we perceive 
consciously, any processing of information is temporally 
decreasing between 500% up 1000%. Thirdly, it is possible to 
observe an apparent “interference” between different types of 
information processed in human conscious behaviour. For 
instance, rational calculations (e.g. resolve a mathematical 
problem) interfere with kinesthetic performance [61], 
supporting the idea to treat intelligence as a whole system 
formed by parts of processes. To illustrate, resolving a 
mathematical equation while biking or dancing at the same 
time could be practically impossible. This observation suggests 
that conscious perception would be imposing a balance 
between different processes, and hence a balance of different 
intelligences. Computational interpretation of this observation 
will try to explain the interference between different kinds of 
information as a competition for computational capacity. 
However, as it is stated above, computational capacity 
apparently is not playing any crucial role in perception. This 
analogy also assumes processing of information in a digital 
way, which could be not the best approach to understand the 
brain. Fourthly, some results from behavioral economics and 
decision making have shown that cognitive biases are not 
according with classical probability frameworks [62]. It means 
that it is not always possible to treat emergent brain properties 
in a classical and efficient probabilistic way. 
If consciousness is not a matter of computation capacity 
whereas temporal efficiency decreases in its presence, it could 
be due to its architecture. Many theories have tried to explain 
how consciousness emerges from the brain [23], [24]. 
However, these theories are incomplete although they might be 
partially correct. The incompleteness is because most of these 
theories are descriptions of the phenomenon, instead of 
explanatory theories of the phenomenon (e.g. Classical 
Mechanics or Theory of evolution, although an explanatory 
and/or complete theory does not ensure that it is correct). 
Descriptive theories focus on how the phenomenon works, use 
descriptions without causal mechanisms even when they claim 
it, and without deductive general principles, i.e. they often 
start from the object of study to deduce specific/particular 
principles rather than deducing general principles and in 
consequence explaining the object of study. Furthermore, 
incomplete theories do not answer one of these fundamental 
questions: What is “the object of study”? How does it work? 
Why? Most commonly, they do not explain “why” something 
works as it works. In other words, these theories may partially 
explain how consciousness emerges, but they do not explain 
and do not solve the entire problem. Finally, these approaches 
try to explain awareness or conscious perception in a way that 
is not clearly replicable or implementable in any sense, neither 
with biological elements. Some theories also use the implicit 
idea of computability to explain, for example, conscious 
contents as the access to certain space of integration; and 
competition for space of computation in this space, to explain 
how some processes lose processing capacity when we are 
conscious.  
Another complementary alternative is to understand 
consciousness as intrinsic property due to the particular form of 
information processing in the brain. Here, consciousness will 
be interpreted in this way, as the “interference”, or 
“interaction” of different neural networks dynamics, trying to 
integrate information to resolve each particular network 
problem. More specifically, the brain could be divided into 
different “principal layers” (topologically speaking) which are 
also formed by different levels of layers, each principal layer as 
one kind of neural network interconnected at different levels 
with other networks. Each principal layer can process 
information independently of other principal layers; however 
when they are activated at the same time to resolve 
independent problems, the interaction generates a kind of 
interference on each intrinsic process. From this interaction and 
interference would emerge consciousness as a whole. I will call 
it: Consciousness interaction hypothesis or consciousness 
interference hypothesis. Consciousness would be a process of 
processes which mainly interferes with neural integration. 
These processes are indivisible part of consciousness, and their 
interference is the consciousness. This hypothesis might allow 
us to explain why the brain is not always an efficient machine, 
why decisions are not always optimal, why it is possible to 
observe an apparent loss of processing capacity between 
different types of information processing in human conscious 
behaviour, and more interesting, it allows us to implement a 
mechanism on other machines than biological machines. 
Although these ideas still do not answer the “why” question of 
a complete theory of consciousness, they are part of a global 
framework related with codification, processing of 
information and category theories which will intent to respond 
that question and will be developed in further works. Some 
important differences of this framework with previous 
approaches are: (1) awareness would emerge from breaking 
neural integration, synchrony and symmetry of the system; (2) 
conscious perception would correspond to dynamics operations 
between networks more than containers formed by networks 
where to put contents. In this sense, consciousness is a 
distributed phenomenon by essence; (3) consciousness 
interaction hypothesis could be an implementable mechanism 
for artificial intelligence.  
Finally, one crucial observation emerges from this 
discussion. Consciousness interaction hypothesis requires a 
balance between different processes involved in its emergence. 
That is why extraordinary capacities in some processes are 
compensated with normal or sub-normal capacities in other 
processes of information when we are conscious.  
VI. TYPES OF COGNITION AND TYPES OF MACHINES 
Consciousness interaction is a different framework, 
therefore it is needed to re-interpret some definitions from 
previous theories about consciousness [24]. Conscious states 
as different levels of awareness (vegetative, sleep, anesthesia, 
altered states, aware) would correspond to different degrees of 
interaction or interference between different networks. In 
consciousness interaction hypothesis, consciousness is not a 
particular state neither has possible states, at difference of 
common definitions. Consciousness should be interpreted as an 
operation/process itself. Contents of consciousness as 
elements or information in the external or internal world which 
at times are part of our conscious perception, would correspond 
to superposition of different oscillation related with 
“intersection points” of interference between networks or the 
network points (nodes) which are influenced/affected by this 
interference/interaction (probably in a scattered/sparse way). 
Finally, conscious processing is normally defined as the 
operations applied to these contents. In consciousness 
interaction framework, it would correspond to constants 
“loops” of interference/interaction on this “intersection points” 
and its dynamic evolution. 
With similar definitions (without this particular interference 
interpretation) and their relations, Shea and Frith have 
identified four categories of cognition [61] depending if 
contents and cognitive processes are conscious or not: Type 0 
cognition corresponds to cognitive processes which are not 
conscious neither in contents nor operations applied to these 
contents. Type 1 cognition is a cognitive process where 
contents are consciously perceived, however operations on 
these contents are not controlled. Type 2 cognition  would 
correspond to contents and operation on these contents 
consciously perceived and controlled. Finally, what I have 
called Type ∞ cognition (to see [63]) can be understood as 
cognition without contents consciously perceived, but 
operations on these contents are consciously controlled. Based 
on these definitions, in Table 1, it is also possible to relate 
these categories with four categories of machines and their 
information processing capabilities [63]: (1) The Machine-
Machine Type 0 Cognition: non-conscious contents and non-
conscious (non-controlled) processing. Optimal choice is 
computation-light but learning-heavy (e.g. Motor Control). 
Examples are robots that we are making today with a high 
learning curve. (2) Conscious-Machine Type 1 Cognition: 
conscious contents but automatic and non-controlled 
processing (e.g. Fallacy questions). The system accesses to a 
wider range of information thanks to first levels of 
interference/interaction between networks (Holistic 
information), however some optimal or specific algorithmic 
calculations may become intractable. (3) Super Machine Type 
2 Cognition: contents are conscious and the cognitive process 
is deliberate and controlled thanks to a recursive and sustained 
interference/interaction at certain intersection points from 
different networks (e.g. Reasoning). From a computational 
view, it is considered computation-heavy, learning-light and 
interferes with Type 0. (4) Subjective-Machine Type ∞ 
Cognition: non-conscious content but conscious process (no 
analogy with humans because this condition has not been 
observed). My hypothesis about this type of machines is related 
to Supra reasoning information emerged from organization of 
intelligent parts of this supra system (e.g. Internet).  
Some previous works have been also tried to generalize and 
characterize some features of consciousness that could be 
related with types of machines and/or artificial systems [64]. 
For example in [65], even thought this article still keeps a 
computational view of consciousness and social interactions, 
they conclude that consciousness is not only related with 
computational capacity and put emphasis in social interactions 
(which can also be related with emotions) as trigger of 
consciousness. Another example is [66], where some 
categories defined can be related with some types of machine 
mentioned above. Nevertheless some crucial differences with 
these articles are: 1) Here, types of machines directly emerge 
from previous theoretical and experimental definitions of types 
of cognition. In this context, types of machines are general 
categories related with definition of cognition and its relation 
with consciousness. 2) In this article is not assumed any 
especial optimization processes to reach consciousness, 
actually quite contrary, interference processes as not-optimal 
processes and some still missing properties of soft 
materials/brains would be related with its emergence. 
Due to these not-optimal processes, each type of machines 
has limitations [63]. For instance, conscious machine type 1 
cognition does not have strong algorithmic calculation 
capabilities or rational/logical intelligence, because accuracy is 
lost in favour of consciousness as fast access to holistic 
information. Subjective machines type ∞ cognition probably 
will not be able to interact physically with us, and even less 
dance like us or feel like us, however it is the most likely 
scenario where machines and computers will be able to 
overtake some humans capabilities and keeping current 
hardware in a non anthropomorphic way. For this machine, 
subjective experience could be something completely different 
to what it means for humans. In other words, Subjective 
Machines are free of human criteria of subjectivity. Eventually, 
Super Machine is the only chance for AI to overcome human 
abilities as such. This machine would have subjective 
experiences like humans, at the same time that it would have 
the option to control the accuracy of its own logic/rational 
process; however, it is also vulnerable to what subjective 
experiences imply: the impact of emotions in its performance 
and biased behavior as humans. 
 Non conscious Processing  Conscious Processing 
Non conscious contents Machine-Machine  Subjective Machine  
Conscious contents Conscious Machine  Super Machine 
Table 1. Types of machines according different types of cognition, 
contents and information processing exposed above. 
VII. IMPLICATIONS FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
If we can reach the gap to make conscious machine type 1 
or 2 cognition, these machines will lose the meaningful 
characteristics of being a computer, that is to say: to resolve 
problems with accuracy, speed and obedience. Any conscious 
machine is not a useful machine anymore; unless they wanted 
to collaborate with us. It means the machine can do whatever it 
wants; it has the power to do it and the intention to do it. It 
could be considered a biological new species, more than a 
machine or only computer. More important: based on our 
previous sections and empirical evidence from psychology and 
neuroscience [36], [63], it is not possible to expect an 
algorithm to control the process of emergency of consciousness 
in this kind of machines, and in consequence, we would not be 
able to control them. 
With this in mind, some paradoxes appear. The first 
paradox is that the only way to overcome human capabilities 
with computers is making machines which are not computer 
anymore. The second paradox is that when we make conscious 
machines type 1 and/or type 2 cognition, a process of 
interference, due to consciousness, will affect the global 
processing of information, allowing extraordinary rational or 
emotional capabilities, but never both extraordinary capabilities 
at the same time or even in the same individual. In fact, if the 
machine is a computer-like-brain, this system will require a 
human-like-intelligence that apparently requires a balance 
between different intelligences, as stated above. That means 
that a machine type 1 or type 2 cognition would never 
overcome human abilities at all, or if it does, it will have some 
limitations like humans. The last paradox, if humans are able to 
build conscious machine that overcomes human capabilities: Is 
the machine more intelligent than humans or are humans still 
more intelligent because we could build it? 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS  
These comments seek to motivate discussion. The first 
objective was to show typical assumptions and misconceptions 
when we speak about AI and brains. Perhaps, in sight of some 
readers, this article is also based on misunderstandings, which 
would be another evidence of the imperative need for close 
interaction between biological sciences, such as neuroscience, 
and computational sciences. The second objective was tried to 
overcome this assumptions and expose a hypothetical 
framework to allow conscious machines. However, from this 
idea emerge paradoxical conclusions of what a conscious 
machine is and what it implies. 
The hypotheses stated above are part of “prove of concept” 
to be commented and reformulated. They are part of a work in 
progress. Thanks to category theory and others theoretical 
frameworks, it is expected to develop these ideas on 
consciousness interaction hypothesis more deeply, and relate 
them with other theories on consciousness, its differences and 
similarities. In this respect, it is reasonable to consider that a 
new focus that integrates different theories is needed. This 
article is just the starting point of a global framework on 
foundation of computation, which expects to understand and to 
connect physical properties of the brain with its emergent 
properties in a replicable and implementable way to AI.  
In conclusion, one suggestion of this paper is to interpret 
the idea of information processing carefully, perhaps in a new 
way and in opposition to the usual computational meaning of 
this term, specifically in biological science. Discussions about 
it and other future concepts instead of information processing 
into the brain should be expanded in further works. 
Additionally, although this work explicitly denies the analogy 
brain-digital-computer, it is still admissible a machine-like-
brain, where consciousness interaction could be an alternative 
to implement desirable high intelligences in machines and 
robots. Even if this alternative is neither deterministic nor 
controlled and presents many ethical questions, it is one 
alternative that might allow us to implement a mechanism for 
conscious machine, at least theoretically. If this hypothesis is 
correct and it is possible to reach the gap of its implementation, 
any machine with consciousness based on brain dynamics may 
have high intelligences properties. However, some kind of 
intelligence would be more developed than others, because by 
definition, its information processing would also be similar to 
brains which have these restrictions. Finally, these machines 
would paradoxically be autonomous in the most human sense 
of this concept.   
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